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In Bitter v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 18 Sup. Ct. 300, the
Supreme Court recently decided that intentional self-destruction by
the insured when of sound mind is a defense to an action on the
policy, even though the policy does not expressly declare that suicide
will avoid it. One Runk, becoming hopelessly embarrassed finan-
cially, owing to ,speculation and squandering of trust property, took
out a large amount of insurance with the intention of committing sui-
cide and thereby leaving his executors enough money with which to
pay his debts. The court held that an implied condition that the
insured will not purposely, when of sound mind, take his own life,
must be read into the policy for two principal reasons. First, because
a contrary agreement could not have been within the contemplation
of the parties at the time, for it is reasonably certain that the com-
pany would instantly reject such an application. Life insurance poli-
cies in this respect are like fire insurance policies-though they will
cover losses attributable merely to negligence of the insured, with-
out fraud, they will not cover losses intentionally caused by the
insured. "To hold otherwise is to say that the occurrence of the
event upon the happening of which the company undertook to pay
was intended to be left to his option." And, second, because a con-
tract of insurance expressly providing for payment in such event
would be against public policy as tempting or encouraging the insured
to commit suicide in order to make provision for those dependent
upon him, or to whom he was indebted. The leading case on this
point is Fauntleroy's case (Amicable Society, etc., v. Bolland 4 Bligh N.
R. x94), decided in 183o, holding that death at the hands of the law
as punishment for committing a crime would avoid a contract of
insurance though there was no such exception in the policy.
Such a conclusion seems only natural and yet several State
courts have reached a contrary result, though without much discus-
sion of the subject and perhaps on doubtful grounds (see Fitch v.
Insurance Co., 59 N. Y. 557; Mills v. Rebstock, 29 Minn. 380; 1Vorth-
western, etc., Association of Illinois v. Wanner, 24 Il. App. 357; Morris
v. State Mutual Assurance CO., 39 Atl. Rep. (Penn.) 52). These all rest
on the first case of Fitch v. Ins. Co., which held that the inshired
could recover because the policy was taken out for the benefit, not of
himself, but of his wife and children, and although they were
bound by his representations, and any fraud he may have committed
in taking out the policy, * * * yet. they were not bound by any
acts or declarations done or made by him after the issue of the
policy, unless such acts were in violation of some condition of the
314 •
COMMENT.
policy." And in this way the Pennsylvania Court distinguishes
Ritter v. Ins. Co., from its own case. But if an implied condition
must be read into the policy that the insured, while sane, will not
voluntarily destroy his life, i e., that the contract cannot cover the
risk of suicide, it would seem according to their own reasoning as if it
made no difference who the beneficiary might be. In Smith v.
National Benefit Society, 123 N. Y. 85, when the facts were strikingly
similar to those in Ritter v. Ins. Co., the company set up as a defense
the fraudulent scheme of the insured to take out a large amount of
insurance and then commit suicide and were permitted to prove the
suicide as one of the steps-the final completing-of the scheme and
thus got around the earlier decision in Fitch v. Ins. Co.
The Alabama Supreme Court takes a long-step in advance in Dren-
non v. Mfercantile Trust and Debosit Co., 23 So. Rep. x64. when it ex-
tends to a private mining and coke manufacturing corporation the six
months preferred claim rule giving priority to the claims of laborers
for wages rendered and of material men for supplies furnished within
six months previous to the appointment of a receiver. This is the
doctrine first clearly laid down by Chief Justice Waite in Fosdick v.
Schall, 99 U. S. 235, when the concern was a railroad corporation.
Stress was laid upon that fact in the opinion. In Xneeland v. Trust
Co., 136 U. S. 89, the Supreme Court expressly declared that the
doctrine would not be extended beyond the exceptional case of a rail-
road. And it is believed that heretofore the courts have been unani-
mous in refusing to extend its application and in maintaining a broad
distinction between railroad and other corporations. But the Alabama
Court (two judges dissenting) proceed upon the theory that "the
bondholders, or the receiver for them, have property, or something of
value, to which the party invoking the court's aid has a better
abstract right-a superior equity." And this equity arises and is
rested upon one or other of three states of fact: (i) That the gross
earnings of the corporation before the receivership, to which its
laborers and persons furnishing necesssary supplies are entitled in
preference to the bondholders, have been diverted from them to the
bondholders or expended in permanently improving the mortgaged
property, or are in the hands of the receiver to be so paid or ex-
pended in further operation of the works for the benefit of the bond-
holders. (2) That, whether there has been any such diversion of the
gross earnings directly or indirectly or not, the laborers have per-
formed services in permanently improving the mortgaged property,
which have inured directly to the benefit of the bondholders in
enhancing the value of their security. (3) That services have been
rendered in keeping the corporation "a going concern," that earnings
have been thus realized and paid to the bondholders or held by the
teceivers, while the laborers have not been paid for services thus
rendered prior to the receiverships. Different decisions of the
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
Supreme Court fully show the application of the doctrine to these
three states of facts in the case of railroad corporations. But the
Alabama Court claims that this equity exists as well in the case of a
private as well as a public corporation. The right to be asserted is
the same, the wrong done the employees is the same, the remedy is
applied on considerations which take no account of whether the cor-
poration is public or private, railroad or manufacturing, the maxim
that he who seeks equity in applying for a receiver must do equity,
applies as much to one as to another. Doubtless the necessity for the
application of the doctrine arises more frequently in railroad cases, and
ordinarily there is a greater necessity that they be kept "going con-
cerns" from the point of view of the public; but from the point of view
of the bondholders there is no such greater necessity and this necessity
should be determined from their standpoint. The limitations which
the principles of the doctrine themselves involve, prevent any
encroachment upon vested rights or any usurpation of mechanic's
lien laws; for they mark a distinct line between the particular corpora-
tion cases to which the doctrine applies and the ordinary cases of
mortgages on property to secure the payment of debts; "there is not
the slightest danger of the secured creditor in any case losing anything
which he is entitled to on recognized principles of equity and good
conscience."
Judge Coleman dissenting says that "the doctrine is a revolution
in jurisprudence, subverting settled principles, and not the applica-
tion of new remedies to existing rights," and that the gross income
covered by prior executed mortgage does not belong in any sense to
the laborer or material man as a matter of equitable right, but to the
bondholder who by contract has secured a prior lien thereon, which
the laborer and material man knew existed when they furnished their
services or supplies. And Fosdick v. Schall is not based upon this
theory of an abstract equity but upon the power of the court to
impose conditions precedent to the appointment of a receiver and the
grant of equitable relief.
Although the primary object of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States was to guarantee complete
freedom to the recently-emancipated colored people, it also gave to
the federal courts the power to declare invalid all state laws and
decisions abridging the rights of citizens, or denying to them the
benefit of due process of law.
A decision rendering invalid a state law was asked for in Holden
v. Hardy, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383, where the state of Utah had passed
a statute that no person should require more than eight hours' work
per day from any employee engaged in a mine, or in the smelting,
reduction, or refining of ores or metal. The constitutionality of this
law was denied upon the ground of class legislation, denial of free-
dom of right to contract, and abridgement of the privileges of a
COMMENT. 317
citizen, depriving him of the equal protection of the laws, and of his
property and liberty without due process of law.
The correctness of the decisions of many of the states, that they
have no power to restrict generally the hours of labor, is not denied
by the Supreme Court; but it holds that this application comes within
the right to provide for the health and safety of employees, being a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. It very aptly decides
that, if a state has the power, always heretofore recognized, to deter-
mine what safeguards shall be thrown about the lives of its citizens, as
regards mechanical contrivances, it certainly can make such reasona-
ble provisions as are necessary for the protection of their health.
